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Abstract  25 
To implement effective resource management and development policies, understanding 26 
behavioral responses of resource users to environmental changes and incentives created by 27 
management systems is imperative. A small-scale mixed fishery in the Maizuru Bay, Japan 28 
provides a natural experiment to evaluate changes in small-scale fishers’ harvesting and 29 
targeting behavior over the years that one of the key species in the fishery experienced a 30 
collapse of the stock. Using data on individual fishers across the pre- and post-collapse 31 
periods, we find that inefficient fishers were forced to shut down or stay idle along with the 32 
collapse of the stock, and this behavior led to an increase in the overall efficiency in the 33 
production of clams. The depletion of the stock, however, imposed a natural constraint on the 34 
operation, resulting in a significant decline in the maximum production achievable by the 35 
remaining fishers. We further show that the collapse of the stock not only affected the 36 
harvesting behavior against the declining species but also led to the expansion of the fishing 37 
capacity and effort to catch other species and the development of aquaculture as an 38 
alternative form of fish production in the region.  39 
Keywords: data envelopment analysis; entry-exit, fisher behavior; small-scale fisheries; stock 40 
collapse  41 
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Introduction 42 
Small-scale fisheries are distinctive from large-scale industrial fisheries not only by the 43 
scale of exploitation but also by the way in which they contribute to the well-being of fishing 44 
communities. The importance of small-scale fisheries has been increasingly recognized in 45 
terms of their role in resource management and of their global contribution to food security 46 
and poverty reduction (Allison and Ellis 2001; Béné et al. 2007; FAO 2014; Weeratunge et al. 47 
2014). About 90% of those employed in wild-capture fisheries are involved in small-scale 48 
fisheries (FAO 2016). Moreover, small-scale fisheries make an important contribution to 49 
local economies in rural coastal areas where alternative sources of income and employment 50 
are limited (Stobutzki et al. 2006; Zeller et al. 2006; Gillett 2009). Global concern about the 51 
status of fish and other aquatic resources, therefore, poses a risk to the well-being and the 52 
social and economic development of fishing communities that directly depend on these 53 
resources (Andrew et al. 2007; Kolding et al. 2014; Béné et al. 2016). 54 
Despite their importance, research on small-scale fisheries is generally underdeveloped 55 
compared with that on large-scale industrial fisheries (FAO/RAP/FIPL 2004; Andrew et al. 56 
2007; Béné et al. 2016; Schuhbauer and Sumaila 2016). This is due in part because small-57 
scale fisheries often occur in vast coastal areas where an effective monitoring and reporting 58 
system is not in place. Reliable data are consequently seldom available to carry out a sound 59 
assessment of the fishery or to quantify its contribution to the households and communities 60 
that depend on these resources. 61 
Insights into behavioral responses of fishery users to changes in resource conditions and 62 
incentives created by management systems is nonetheless important to improve the 63 
management of small-scale fisheries and their contributions to the development of fishery-64 
dependent communities. Unexpected behavioral responses by resource users are known to be 65 
a major source of uncertainty in fisheries management, and therefore, failure to incorporate 66 
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information about human behavior in the design of management systems can result in 67 
unexpected and undesirable outcomes (Wilen et al. 2002; Hilborn et al. 2005; Branch et al. 68 
2006; Grafton et al. 2006; Nøstbakken et al. 2011; Fulton et al. 2011; van Putten et al. 2012). 69 
For example, unexpected behavioral responses to management changes take a variety of 70 
forms and are well documented in the literature. Examples include input substitution from 71 
regulated to unregulated gear and rent dissipation in input-controlled fisheries (Squires 1987; 72 
Dupont 1991; Kompas et al. 2004), an increase in discarding and bycatches, as well as a 73 
concentration of fishing effort across space, time, and species due to the introduction of 74 
individual transferable quotas (Squires et al. 1998; Costello and Deacon 2007; Poos et al. 75 
2010; Emery et al. 2014), and an expansion of effort and stock depletion as a long-term effect 76 
of buyback schemes (Holland et al. 1999a; Weninger and McConnell 2000; Grafton and 77 
Nelson 2007).  78 
In this paper, we aim to provide ex post estimates of how individuals in a small-scale 79 
mixed fishery change their behavior in response to a collapse of one of the key stocks in the 80 
fishery. The focuses are changes in the entry-exit behavior in the production of declining 81 
species as well as changes in the targeting behavior among species in the fishery. The entry-82 
exit behavior of firms and the impact on market performance have been traditionally studied 83 
in the economics literature for a range of industries (Jovanovic 1982; Dixit 1989; Disney et al. 84 
2003; Samaniego 2010). In fisheries, studies have been conducted on the entry and exit of 85 
fishing vessels mostly in industrial fisheries where logbook and other data administered by 86 
management agencies are available (Ward and Sutinen 1994; Holland and Sutinen 1999; 87 
Pradhan and Leung 2004; Smith 2004; Tidd et al. 2011). Although these earlier studies did 88 
not examine a stock collapse period, they consistently found that fishers’ decision to 89 
participate in a fishery and their location choice are positively correlated with resource 90 
abundance and fishing revenue. Similarly, Pascoe et al. (2014) found that fishers’ desire to 91 
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exit the Queensland East Coast Trawl fishery in Australia is highly correlated with overall 92 
satisfaction with fishing that depends on income and a desire to maintain their family 93 
tradition and be part of the industry. Fishers’ exit behaviors and the adjustment of fishing 94 
capacity in declining fisheries have also been examined where a drastic management change, 95 
such as the introduction of a quota system, occurred and where vessel or license buyback 96 
programs were implemented (Holland et al. 1999b; Fox et al. 2006; van Putten and Gardner 97 
2010; Schnier and Felthoven 2013; Cordón Lagares and García Ordaz 2015).    98 
A major obstacle in studying entry-exit behavior and associated outcomes in small-scale 99 
fisheries is the availability of reliable data that can be used to characterize the heterogeneity 100 
among individuals and across time (Jacquet and Pauly 2008). Given this, previous studies 101 
focusing on entry-exit behavior in small-scale fisheries relied on cross-sectional survey data 102 
in which catch and other information was collected in interviews with individual operators 103 
(Ikiara and Odink 2000; Cinner et al. 2009; Muallil et al. 2011; Daw et al. 2012). Some 104 
exceptions include van Putten et al (2013) and Bucaram and Hearn (2014) who estimated the 105 
harvesting behavior of small-scale fishers based on data collected by management authorities 106 
in Australia and the Galapagos Islands, respectively. Moreover, previous studies examined 107 
the readiness of fishers to exit a fishery in response to hypothetical scenarios of declining 108 
catches (Cinner et al. 2009; Muallil et al. 2011; Daw et al. 2012; Slater et al. 2013). 109 
Using a daily record of fishing operations in Maizuru Bay, Japan, we compiled annual 110 
data for the catch and operation days for all fishers who caught clams (Tapes philippinarum) 111 
in the fishery from 1992 to 2014. Individuals operating in Maizuru Bay generally target 112 
multiple species, while clams were one of the main target species before the stock collapsed 113 
in the mid-1990s. The data covered three sub-periods: the pre-collapse, collapse, and post-114 
collapse of the clam stock. Thus, this study differs from previous studies in that our case 115 
study provides a unique data set to evaluate how individuals in a small-scale mixed fishery 116 
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autonomously change their behavior in response to a declining stock of one of the key species 117 
in the fishery and whether such behavioral responses help manage the adverse consequences 118 
of declining resources. 119 
The three research questions addressed in this paper are one, how the rapid depletion of 120 
the stock of clams, and the corresponding decline in catch and revenue, affects the way in 121 
which fishers decide whether to enter, exit, or stay in the production; two, whether, and to 122 
what extent, individuals’ entry-exit behavior is associated with their relative performance in 123 
terms of the catch and technical efficiency (i.e., the amount of catch that could be increased 124 
without requiring extra input); and third, whether fishers change their targeting behavior in 125 
response to the collapse of the clam stock, and whether this leads to the expansion of the 126 
fishing capacity and effort to the production of other species or the development of 127 
aquaculture in the region as an alternative form of fish production.   128 
 129 
Small-scale fishery in the Maizuru Bay, Japan 130 
The focus of this study is the population of clam fishers who are referred to as those who 131 
harvested clams in Maizuru Bay, Japan, during the study period from 1992 to 2014. Other 132 
major species produced in Maizuru Bay include oysters, sea cucumbers, Japanese cockles, 133 
horned turbans, and abalone. Although the relative production share among these six species 134 
varies across fishers and time, these species account for more than 80% of the total sales 135 
share of clam fishers since the beginning of this century. Clam fishers usually sell 136 
unprocessed fish to registered middlemen through an auction process at the local fish market 137 
which is managed by the Kyoto Fishery Cooperative (KFC). The destinations of the fish 138 
products are diverse, including local supermarkets and restaurants, as well as major cities in 139 
Japan and overseas, such as China. For example, clams and oysters are mostly consumed 140 
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domestically, but sea cucumbers are exported to China given the increasing demand for dry 141 
sea cucumbers since 2000. 142 
The small-scale fishery in the Maizuru Bay is conducted predominantly by fishers who 143 
are based in Maizuru city which is in the northern part of Kyoto prefecture (Fig. 1a). The 144 
Maizuru Bay has an area of 22.9 km
2
 with a bay mouth of 2.7 km and a maximum depth of 145 
30 m. Fishers who operate in the area are required to acquire fishing rights from the KFC 146 
according to the fishing area, type of fishing, and equipment used. All fishers also join the 147 
Maizuru branch of the KFC which establishes operational regulations at the local level, such 148 
as catch and gear restrictions. The institutional history and details of Japanese coastal fishery 149 
management are discussed in Yamamoto (1995), Makino and Matsuda (2005), and Uchida 150 
and Makino (2008). 151 
The clam fishing is managed through a catch limit of 50 kg per fisher per day and a 152 
minimum mesh size. Given the simple form of fishing and gear restrictions in place, there is 153 
no variation among individuals in the technology used. Each fisher uses a small boat (Fig. 1c) 154 
and common standardized gear, including a small dredge (joren in Japanese), which is 155 
normally made by the fishing operators themselves (Fig. 1b). Clam-fishing grounds are 156 
located at shallow areas so that large vessels (> 2t) cannot be used. Clam fishing is conducted 157 
on an individual basis within one day for about 4 to 5 hours typically. Most variation in input 158 
is thus attributed to the number of days spent clam fishing per year, which varied from 1 to 159 
around 250 days.   160 
[Figure 1 about here] 161 
The catch of clams has significantly declined due to a collapse of the stock from the mid-162 
1990s to the early 2000s (Fig. 2). We use this period as a reference period to divide the 163 
sample into three sub-periods: the pre-collapse, collapse and post-collapse periods. The pre-164 
collapse period covers 1992 to 1996 corresponding to the years during which the total catch 165 
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was relatively high at between 81 and 145 tonnes per year (Fig. 2a). The second sub-period is 166 
1997 to 2003, which coincides with the years when the clam fishers experienced a continuous 167 
decline in catch. Over the seven years of the collapse period, the total annual catch decreased 168 
from 108 to 6 tonnes or by 94%. The last sub-period is the post-collapse period of 2004 to 169 
2014 when the total annual catch of clams was consistently low at between 0.4 and 9 tonnes.  170 
[Figure 2 about here] 171 
The drastic decline in total catch of clams resulted in a decrease in the participation rate in 172 
clam fishing (Fig. 2b). During the pre-collapse period, there were around 60 fishers with 173 
more than 2,000 total operation days. During the subsequent collapse period, the number of 174 
clam fishers and the total operation days dropped remarkably to 19 fishers and 372 days, 175 
respectively. During the post-collapse period, the number of clam fishers and total operation 176 
days further decreased. In 2014, only 8 fishers remained with 49 total operation days.  177 
Despite the sustained decline, the cause of the collapse of the stock has not been fully 178 
determined. Possible reasons include Perkinsus infections, oyster reef formation in the 179 
shallows, and the emergence of predators, such as the shore swimming crab (Charybdis 180 
japonica), Japanese blackhead seabream (Acanthopagrus schlegelii), and pufferfish (Takifugu 181 
poecilonotus), that feed on the clams in the subtidal zone (KPAFFTC 2009; FSERC 2015; 182 
Takahashi et al. 2016). In response to the stock collapse, the KFC attempted to increase the 183 
productivity of the clam population with various methods, including releasing young clam 184 
shells (KPAFFTC 2009), but the success of such recovery efforts has been moderate.  185 
 186 
Methods 187 
Data 188 
Data on fishery production and sales data for each fishing operator who is registered in 189 
Maizuru were retrieved from a database administered by the KFC. The KFC records the daily 190 
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quantity and the sales of all fish landed at the Maizuru Fish Market for all commercial fishers. 191 
A total of 1,676,058 daily data were collected from the database for the study period 1992 to 192 
2014. Using individual identification numbers, we identified 152 fishers who caught clams 193 
during the study period (i.e., clam fishers). From this database, we complied the final data set 194 
consisting of annual catches (in 100 g), revenue (in JPY), and operation days from 1992 to 195 
2014 for these clam fishers.  196 
Another database (i.e., vessel registration cards in 2016) was used to retrieve data on 197 
vessel characteristics, including the vessel tonnage, length, and engine horsepower. We used 198 
the launch date of each vessel active in 2016 to track down the characteristics of these vessels 199 
for the period 1992 to 2014. However, we collected data only for vessels that were active in 200 
2016 as the vessel registration cards for fishers who had retired were not available at the time 201 
of the study. This database also contains socio-demographic information about the fishers’ 202 
age and whether their parents had been involved in clam fishing in Maizuru. In the end, we 203 
collected data for 65 individuals from this database, and the data were used to examine 204 
changes in the physical capacity of the vessels and how fishers’ entry-exit behavior was 205 
associated with socio-demographic information. In addition to quantitative data, information 206 
regarding the way in which clam fishing has operated and the social and institutional changes 207 
in the fishery community was collected during interviews with current clam fishers and 208 
officers at the local Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA).  209 
 210 
Characterizing entry-exit behavior 211 
Following the literature on the entry and exit of firms (Disney et al. 2003; Moffitt 2003; 212 
Okamoto and Sjöholm 2005), we studied fishers’ entry-exit behavior by categorizing each 213 
individual based on four establishment types of operations in each year t:, namely entrants, 214 
exitors, one-year-only, and stayers. This categorization was made according to the harvest 215 
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information for each fisher who conducted clam fishing in year t. A schematic diagram of 216 
entry-exit behavior is provided in Fig. 3. The definition of each establishment type is as 217 
follows: Entrants are those who catch clams in year t but not in year t-1; exitors are those who 218 
catch clams in year t but not in t+1. It is also possible that an entrant exits after one year, and 219 
a fisher who behaves in this way is referred to as one-year-only. The last establishment type 220 
is stayers who are not entrants, exitors, or one-year-only, and thus, they catch clams for three 221 
consecutive years. The sum of the four establishment types in a particular year is not 222 
compatible with the total number of fishers in the year as one-year-only fishers are both 223 
entrants and exitors. The total number of fishers in year t is calculated by subtracting the 224 
number of one-year-only fishers from the sum of the stayers, entrants, and exitors.  225 
[Figure 3 about here] 226 
 227 
Measuring individual performance: catch and technical efficiency 228 
We measured the performance of individual operations in terms of the catch and the 229 
technical efficiency of clam fishers each year. The former was directly derived from the data 230 
compiled for this study, and the latter was estimated using data envelopment analysis (DEA; 231 
Coelli et al. 2005). To estimate the technical efficiency, we first define the feasible 232 
production set which represents a feasible set of input and output combinations that are 233 
attainable. Let 
tΨ  denote the feasible production set, and let yjt and Djt be the level of 234 
production and number of days spent fishing by fisher j in year t, respectively (Fig. 4). The 235 
feasibility of an input-output combination (Djt, yjt) in year t means that it is physically 236 
possible to obtain output yjt when the number of days Djt is spent for the year, regardless of 237 
whether such production is efficient or not. The output-oriented measure of technical 238 
efficiency for fisher j is then defined as ( ){ }sup 1 ,jt jt jt tD yθ θ θ= ≥ ∈Ψ  where θjt represents 239 
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a proportional increase in the output for fisher j to be able to achieve for a number of days 240 
spent in year t (Fig. 4).  241 
With this definition of efficiency, a clam fisher is said to be technically efficient when he 242 
is unable to expand production from a given number of days spent; i.e., θjt = 1. In other words, 243 
the input-output combination (Djt,yjt) for this fisher is on the production frontier (point A in 244 
Fig. 4). In contrast, a clam fisher is said to be technically inefficient when it is possible to 245 
expand the production from a given number of days spent; i.e., θjt > 1 (point B in Fig. 4). In 246 
this study, only the number of operation days was included as an input, and no other input 247 
variables were incorporated in the estimation of technical efficiency. This is because there is 248 
no variation among individuals in the technology used in the fishery, and the number of hours 249 
spent fishing per day is also similar among individuals. Moreover, clam fishing is conducted 250 
on an individual basis and fishing grounds are located at shallow areas and mudflat at low 251 
tide. This means that it is not possible for a large vessel to access to the fishing grounds, and 252 
other physical characteristics of vessels, such as the length and horsepower of vessels, do not 253 
contribute to the productivity. In other words, most variation in inputs is attributed to the 254 
number of days spent per year, and the heterogeneity in efficiency among individuals is 255 
attributable to differences in their experience, as well as skills in handling the equipment (i.e., 256 
joren dredge) and locating concentrations of clams.  257 
[Figure 4 about here] 258 
Our aim is to estimate θjt so that the standardized technical efficiency score can be 259 
calculated as
1
jt jtTE θ
−=  for fisher j in year t. The technical efficiency score, TEjt, is bounded 260 
between zero and one since θjt ≥ 1; as the efficiency score TEjt increases, the fisher operates 261 
closer to the production frontier, or at a higher efficiency, than other fishers do. We used 262 
DEA to obtain the estimate of technical efficiency. DEA is a common approach used to 263 
estimate efficiency with micro-data (Tingley et al. 2005; Oliveira et al. 2010; Rust et al. 264 
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2017). Specifically, for a fisher who operates at (Djt, yjt), the DEA estimator of the technical 265 
efficiency measure is given as:  266 
{ }
1
, 1 1 1
ˆ max 1 ;  ; 1
J
jt jt j
J J J
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
z j j j
y z y z D D z
θ
θ θ θ
= = = =
  
= ≥ ≤ ≤ = 
  
∑ ∑ ∑ ,   (1)  267 
where 0jtz ≥  is the intensity variable that determines the piecewise linear production 268 
frontier by connecting the observed input and output data. The last constraint 1jtj z =∑  269 
implies that the frontier exhibits variable return to scale, which is a commonly used 270 
assumption in the literature (Tingley et al. 2005; Scheld and Anderson 2016; Rust et al. 271 
2017). The production frontier may alternatively exhibit a constant return to scale, implying 272 
that a proportionate increase in the number of days per annum results in the same 273 
proportionate increase in output. This assumption is appropriate for the estimation of 274 
technical efficiency when all fishers operate at an optional scale, so that all fishers cannot 275 
increase their productivity by changing the scale of their operations (Coelli et al. 2005). 276 
However, this is unlikely to be the case in the Maizuru Bay clam fishing given that the fishers 277 
were subject to constraints on operations due to the stock depletion. The value of θjt was 278 
estimated with equation (1) for each fisher j from 1992 to 2014, and the technical efficiency 279 
score 
1
jt jtTE θ
−=  was then calculated for all j and t. The linear programming problem in (1) 280 
was solved numerically using Matlab. For the technical details of the DEA estimator in 281 
equation (1), see, for example, Coelli et al. (2005), Tingley et al. (2005), and Oliveira et al. 282 
(2010). 283 
 284 
Linking efficiency and entry-exit behavior 285 
To examine the relationship between the level of efficiency at which individuals operate 286 
and their entry-exit behavior, we estimated a truncated regression of technical efficiency. Full 287 
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details of the model specification and estimation method are provided in the appendix. In 288 
short, the regression model includes dummy variables for the entrants, exitors, and one-year-289 
only as explanatory variables; the corresponding coefficients measure the difference in 290 
technical efficiency between stayers and other establishment types. Furthermore, three 291 
models of time effects are considered. The first model includes dummy variables for the 292 
collapse and post-collapse periods as explanatory variables; the corresponding coefficients 293 
show a change in technical efficiency from the pre-collapse to the collapse and post-collapse 294 
periods. The second and third models instead include a time trend as an explanatory variable, 295 
i.e., Trendt = 1,2,… and the corresponding coefficient measures the intertemporal change in 296 
technical efficiency for the entire study period from 1992 to 2014. A common time effect for 297 
all establishment types is assumed for the second model, whereas the third model also 298 
incorporates heterogeneous time effects across different establishment types, that is, Trendt × 299 
Entrantjt, Trendt × Exitorjt, and Trendt × OneYearjt.  300 
 301 
Results 302 
Entry-exit behavior  303 
The dynamics of entry-exit behavior is significantly associated with the state of the clam 304 
stock (Fig. 5). During the pre-collapse period, it was common for fishers to continuously 305 
participate in clam fishing over consecutive years, as shown in that the number of stayers was 306 
the highest establishment type from 1993 to 1996. The share of stayers was relatively stable 307 
at around 50% until the middle of the collapse period, 1997 to 2003; however, once the stock 308 
collapsed, the number of stayers declined consistently along with the decrease in catch. That 309 
is, the share of stayers became as low as 30% in the end of the collapse period and then 310 
dropped further to 11% in 2010.  311 
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Fishers changed their entry-exit behavior in response to the persistent decline in the catch, 312 
such that they participated for one or two years only or repeatedly exited and re-entered the 313 
production of clams. This type of behavior was particularly evident in the post-collapse 314 
period during which the shares of the entrants and exitors both increased. For example, the 315 
mean shares of the entrants and exitors was about 30% during the pre-collapse period, but 316 
their shares increased to around 45% during the post-collapse period. The simultaneous 317 
increase in the shares of the entrants and exitors also means that there was an increase in the 318 
share of fishers who participated in clam fishing for one year only. The share of one-year-319 
only fishers was relatively stable at a low level with a mean rate of 16% between 1993 and 320 
2006, whereas the share of fishers who behaved in this way increased to 44% during the post-321 
collapse period.  322 
 [Figure 5 about here]  323 
Fishers’ entry-exit behavior was significantly related to their annual catch and how the 324 
catch was affected by the state of the stock (Fig. 6). During the pre-collapse period, there was 325 
a significant difference in the annual catch between stayers and other establishment types, 326 
with the stayers’ mean catch 8 to 22 times greater than the mean catch by other establishment 327 
types. Among the four establishment types, however, stayers experienced the largest decline 328 
in the annual catch from 3.0 tonnes in the pre-collapse period to 1.6 tonnes in the collapse 329 
period and then to 0.4 tonnes in the post-collapse period. In contrast, the relative decline in 330 
the annual catch by other establishment types was moderate as the catch for the other 331 
establishment types was initially low. In other words, the depletion of the clam stock had 332 
relatively little impact on the harvesting behavior of those who were initially engaged in the 333 
production of clams intermittently, but the decline affected those who were actively engaged 334 
in clam fishing by discouraging continuous participation.  335 
[Figure 6 about here] 336 
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 337 
Technical efficiency dynamics  338 
Technical efficiency of clam fishers was also highly sensitive to the state of the stock (Fig. 339 
7). In the first 10 years of the study period, which includes both the pre-collapse and collapse 340 
periods, the mean technical efficiency score remained at a stable level between 0.37 and 0.52 341 
(Fig. 7a). However, there was a significant variation in the efficiency level at which 342 
individuals operated each year. The least efficient fisher consistently had an efficiency score 343 
of below 0.10, and more than 25% of fishers operated with an efficiency score of less than 344 
0.20, meaning that there was a significant opportunity for these fishers to increase their catch 345 
given the number of days spent. During the same period, however, about 5% to 20% of the 346 
fishers operated highly efficiently with an efficiency score of 0.80 or above indicating that 347 
there was little scope for these fishers to increase their output without spending more days. 348 
These efficient fishers consistently caught more than 90% of the total catch of clams.  349 
[Figure 7 about here] 350 
There was an upward trend in the mean efficiency after 1999 during the middle of the 351 
collapse period (Fig. 7a), which reflected that less efficient fishers ceased harvesting clams 352 
when the stock collapsed. Nevertheless, the upward trend in efficiency during the collapse 353 
and post-collapse periods did not lead to an increase in the catches of individuals who 354 
remained in clam fishing. Conversely, the mean catch per fisher and the maximum catch 355 
attainable for each day of operation (i.e., the efficient production frontier) declined 356 
significantly along with the collapse of the stock (Fig. 7b).  357 
 [Table 1 about here] 358 
In the regression analysis, all models show that the coefficients for the entrants and 359 
exitors are significantly negative, indicating that stayers operated more efficiently than 360 
entrants and exitors did (Table 1). After controlling for these differences, however, we find 361 
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no difference in technical efficiency between stayers and one-year-only fishers. Model 1 362 
shows that the difference in technical efficiency between the pre-collapse and collapse 363 
periods was not significant, but higher efficiency was evident during the post-collapse period. 364 
In Model 2, we also find an increasing trend in technical efficiency of clam fishers given that 365 
the coefficient of the time trend is significantly positive. These results are consistent with the 366 
result shown in Fig. 7 of an upward trend in technical efficiency during the post-collapse 367 
period. Further, the coefficients of the interaction terms between the time trend and each 368 
establishment type in Model 3 is not statistically significant, suggesting the presence of a 369 
common time effect for all fishers instead of heterogeneous time effects between different 370 
establishment types. The presence of the positive time effect suggests that there may have 371 
been an increase in the efficiency of individual operations if the fishers decided to harvest 372 
clams over consecutive years.   373 
 374 
Adjustment in vessel capacity and target species  375 
The collapse of the clam stock affected the physical characteristics of the vessels owned 376 
by clam fishers in Maizuru in terms of the tonnage and length of the vessels and the engine 377 
horsepower (Table 2). All three measures suggest a consistent increase in vessel capacity 378 
along with the stock collapse. However, the increase in the vessels’ physical capacity did not 379 
occur because of intensified race-to-fish or race-to-invest behavior among individuals 380 
engaged in clam fishing, as evident from the fact that i) the vessel capacity used for 381 
harvesting clams remained unchanged (Table 2), ii) the number of clam fishers dropped 382 
remarkably during this period (Fig. 2b), iii) the technical efficiency in the fishery increased 383 
with the decreased efficient catch (Fig. 7). The last two points are consistent with empirical 384 
evidence that race behaviors are observed with an increased number of fishing operators and 385 
decreased technical efficiency.
 
 The increase in vessel capacity in Maizuru was instead 386 
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associated with a change in the fishers’ targeting behavior. This is reflected in that the 387 
number of vessels owned by these fishers became less specialized in clam fishing and were 388 
used to harvest other species (Table 2). During the pre-collapse period, the share of all 389 
vessels used for clam fishing was stable at around 70%; however, the share of such vessels 390 
dropped to 51% after the collapse of the clam stock. This is also reflected in the change in the 391 
composition of vessels registered in Maizuru (Fig. 8). That is, the number of non-powered 392 
and small vessels (< 2t) has consistently decreased along with the stock collapse of clams, but 393 
the change in the number of larger vessels (≥ 2t), which cannot be used for harvesting clams, 394 
was relatively moderate.   395 
[Table 2 about here] 396 
[Figure 8 about here] 397 
To further examine the way in which the targeting behavior of clam fishers changed, and 398 
therefore, how the composition of the species in the catch was rebalanced in response to the 399 
decline of the clam stock, we calculated the change in the share of each species in the fishers’ 400 
total revenue. From 1993 to 2013, clam fishers, on average, had around JPY 1.9 million 401 
(approximately USD 15,500) of revenue per year, and this value was stable at this level 402 
throughout the study period (Fig. 9). Despite the stable revenue across the two decades, 403 
however, there was a significant change in the mix of species in the total fishing revenue. In 404 
particular, income that had been derived previously from harvesting clams was substituted 405 
with income from other species, and thus, the clam fishers were able to maintain their total 406 
revenue despite the decline of the clam stock. More specifically, during the pre-collapse 407 
period, revenue from clams had the highest share at 35%, but the share continuously declined 408 
to 7.7% during the post-collapse period.  409 
[Figure 9 about here] 410 
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The two major species that fishers substituted for clams were oysters (Crassostrea gigas) 411 
and sea cucumbers (Holothuroidea). The share of these species increased from 13% and 7.5% 412 
during the pre-collapse period to 33% and 27% during the post-collapse period, respectively. 413 
Sea cucumbers are caught in the wild, whereas oyster production involves both wild-capture 414 
and aquaculture production. The exact proportion of wild and aquaculture oyster production 415 
is not identifiable as the form of production is not recorded when the catch data are entered in 416 
the KFC database. Interviews with local fishers and cooperative officers, however, suggested 417 
that aquaculture production increased consistently since 2000, but wild production decreased 418 
gradually during the same period. 419 
The period when the clam catch declined coincided with the period in which the 420 
production of other species boomed, and consequently, clam fishers were able to change their 421 
production mix in a way that the reduction in clam revenue was fully offset by an increase in 422 
revenue from other species. This is shown in Fig. 10 which presents a change in the revenue 423 
share of different species for each establishment type. The previous observation of the 424 
increasing trend in the revenue share of oysters and sea cucumbers was consistent across all 425 
establishment types. However, only stayers substituted revenue from oysters and sea 426 
cucumbers for the revenue from clams (Fig. 10d). Catching clams was the stayers’ main 427 
source of income before the stock collapsed, and other species constituted secondary income. 428 
In contrast, for non-stayers, the increase in the revenue share of oysters and sea cucumbers 429 
during the post-collapse period was not associated with the reduction in clam revenue but 430 
with the reduction in revenue from other species. The share of clams in the total fishing 431 
revenue of non-stayers was as low as 2% during the pre-collapse period, so that harvesting 432 
clams was a secondary source of income for them even before the stock collapsed (Fig. 10a–433 
c).  434 
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The increased revenue share of oysters and sea cucumbers during the post-collapse period, 435 
regardless of the establishment types, was associated with the greater specialization in these 436 
species toward the end of the study period that occurred with the rapid development in the 437 
production of these species but independent of the collapse of the clam stock. In addition, 438 
despite the different income implications of the declining clam stock for stayers and other 439 
establishment types, the distribution of the mean revenue from the fishery during the post-440 
collapse period was similar for all establishment types. However, there was a significant 441 
difference for stayers and non-stayers during the transition to the post-collapse distribution of 442 
the mean revenue because of the initial difference in the production mix before the collapse 443 
of the clam stock in the beginning of the 1990s.        444 
[Figure 10 about here] 445 
 446 
Discussion 447 
Although small-scale fisheries provide an invaluable contribution for coastal regions of 448 
many countries, the sustainability of small-scale fisheries around the world is under 449 
increasing threat. The behavioral responses of fishery users to changes in the status of 450 
resources and the associated outcome in the fishery are important considerations to enhance 451 
the management of small-scale fisheries, as well as to promote the sustainable development 452 
of fishing communities. In this paper, we quantitatively examined how the behavior of 453 
individuals in a small-scale mixed fishery changes when the stock of the key species in the 454 
fishery is subject to a sustained decline. We used a unique data set from the Maizuru Bay 455 
small-scale mixed fishery which experienced a rapid decline in the stock of clams from the 456 
mid-1990s to the early 2000s.  457 
The results are relevant for other small-scale fisheries that face rapid depletion of 458 
important species and where local fishers autonomously adjust behavior in response to such 459 
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environmental changes. Notably, the collapse of the clam stock did not occur uniquely in 460 
Maizuru but widely throughout Japan in the mid-1980s to the end of 1990s (Matsukawa et al. 461 
2008). This nationwide decline in clam fisheries was unanticipated as the geographic 462 
locations of these fisheries are diverse, and previous studies have identified a range of 463 
different drivers, including overexploitation of adult populations, the degradation of the 464 
habitat through coastal development, the emergence of predators due to warmer sea 465 
temperatures, and the development of parasitic infections (Hamaguchi et al. 1998; Tsutsumi 466 
2006; Matsukawa et al. 2008; Park et al. 2008). The local FCAs that are responsible for 467 
managing fishery resources within local jurisdictions have attempted to rebuild the stock by, 468 
for example, implementing input and output controls, creating no-take zones, and restoring 469 
the habitat, but recovery of the stock has not been confirmed. This paper provides important 470 
insights into how the entry-exit behavior and production pattern of small-scale fishers are 471 
impacted by the collapse of one of the most important stocks in the region. 472 
The results highlight that fishers’ decisions whether to enter, exit, or stay in the 473 
production of clams are closely related to the current state of the stock. More than 50% of the 474 
fishers continued harvesting clams over consecutive years before the stock collapsed. In 475 
contrast, once the stock collapsed, the proportion of fishers who behaved in this way dropped 476 
to as low as 11%. The collapse of the stock, however, did not force all fishers to shut down 477 
entirely but provided individuals with an incentive to stay idle and intermittently participate 478 
in the production. Intermittent participation was possible because clam fishing in the Maizuru 479 
Bay is conducted with simple equipment and a small capital investment; thus, the cost of 480 
holding idle capacity was minimal.  481 
The increase in the number of fishers who intermittently participated in clam fishing also 482 
suggests the emergence of opportunistic behavior along with the decline of the stock as they 483 
caught clams when it provided additional income. An institutional factor that enabled fishers 484 
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to operate in this way is that these clam fishers have the right (gyogyoken) to catch multiple 485 
species within the Bay. This means that the fishers were not required to decide their 486 
production mix in advance but could catch clams when the opportunity arose. Moreover, one 487 
may expect a possible relationship between fishers who behave in this way and their socio-488 
demographic characteristics; however, we found no significant difference in mean age (48 to 489 
53 years) and whether the fishers’ parents were involved in clam fishing (31% to 37%) 490 
among the four establishment types. The insignificant relationship with these socio-491 
demographic characteristics is also related to the institutional context of Japanese coastal 492 
fisheries management. Those who have another profession outside the fishery in Maizuru 493 
Bay are generally unable to obtain rights to catch clams unless they have family or kinship 494 
relations in the local fishing community.  495 
There was a consistent increase in technical efficiency during the period in which the 496 
catch of clams has drastically declined. This result is consistent with our expectation that the 497 
collapse of the stock forced inefficient fishers to shut down or stay idle, thus increasing the 498 
overall efficiency. The increase in technical efficiency was also accompanied by a smaller 499 
difference in productivity among the individuals who remained in the production of clams as 500 
only those who could survive with the declining stock continued to participate. This result is 501 
in line with those of other studies that showed that the probability that vessels will exit 502 
increases when they have lower benefits from staying in the fishery (Pradhan and Leung 2004; 503 
Smith 2004; Tidd et al. 2011). However, the present results also show that the increased 504 
efficiency in the production of declining stock did not result in an increase in the catches; 505 
instead, the efficient production frontier continuously declined given that the depletion of the 506 
stock imposed a natural constraint on operations. The development of such constraint is also 507 
reflected in an increase in the minimum efficiency, particularly during the post-collapse 508 
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period during which there was little scope for fishers to expand the catch given the depleted 509 
resources. 510 
The way in which individuals decide whether they will enter, exit, or stay in the 511 
production of clams is highly correlated with the efficiency of individual operation. The 512 
regression analysis shows that fishers who continued harvesting clams operated more 513 
efficiently than fishers who exited in the subsequent year. This observation reinforces the 514 
previous result that the declining stock forced inefficient fishers to exit. New entrants were 515 
also less efficient than those who were already in operation for multiple years, suggesting that 516 
stayers were more likely to possess skills in handling the equipment and locating 517 
concentrations of clams. However, this relative advantage of experienced fishers over 518 
inexperienced fishers may diminish quickly because clam fishing in the Maizuru Bay is 519 
carried out within a restricted geographic area and with simple equipment; thus, information 520 
and innovation can readily be shared among fishery users. However, further research is 521 
needed to formally examine the way in which the flow of information and innovation occurs 522 
among small-scale fishery users and how it affects their harvesting behavior.   523 
The collapse of the clam stock affected not only the harvesting behavior of individuals 524 
against declining species but also led to the expansion of the fishing capacity and effort to the 525 
production of other species and the development of aquaculture in the region. In the results, 526 
this effect was demonstrated by an increase in three measures of physical vessel capacity (i.e., 527 
tonnage, length, and engine power) in the region, as well as by changes in the targeting 528 
behavior of clam fishers, namely, that the revenue derived from the production of clams was 529 
substituted with income from other species that involved wild-capture and aquaculture 530 
production. The increase in revenue from alternative species was sufficient to offset the 531 
reduction in clam revenue. That is, given the availability of alternative species in the region 532 
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and the fishers’ ability to switch target species, their income remained almost unaffected 533 
despite the stock collapse of the key species in the fishery. 534 
Such behavioral changes by individuals in Maizuru were possible for at least three 535 
reasons. First, it was a common practice for clam fishers to be engaged in different forms of 536 
fish production to diversify their sources of income as the revenue from clams was sensitive 537 
to seasonal fluctuations in the productivity and price of clams. This means that before the 538 
stock collapsed, clam fishers had already invested in capital that was malleable and useable 539 
for catching other species. The fishers also possessed the skills necessary to harvest other 540 
species, and thus, the cost of rebalancing the composition of species in production was 541 
relatively low. Furthermore, diversification of income sources between wild-capture and 542 
aquaculture production was possible for clam fishers because the entry barriers to oyster 543 
aquaculture were relatively low. Clam fishers were not required to establish a private 544 
business enterprise that involved significant capital investment to set up aquaculture 545 
production on their own. Instead, those who already had fishing rights in the Bay could lease 546 
a license from the local FCA and use existing community-managed infrastructure, if any was 547 
available at that time. Moreover, the local FCA expanded dedicated areas for aquaculture in 548 
response to the increased production of oysters and other products in the 2000s. 549 
Second, the two major species that fishers substituted for clams were sea cucumbers and 550 
oysters, both of which occur within the Maizuru Bay. Therefore, those who were affected by 551 
the decline in the stock of clams were not required to relocate. The availability of alternative 552 
sources of production in the same area as the declining species is an important consideration 553 
in the context of small-scale fishing communities because their notable characteristic is that 554 
people express a desire not to move away from their communities as local fisheries are 555 
closely tied to their personal and family identities (McGoodwin 2001). In Japanese small-556 
scale fishing communities, a particular attachment to place is also associated with the fact 557 
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that fishing rights in one area is granted to the local FCA by the prefectural government and 558 
protected by the Fishery Cooperatives Law (Uchida and Makino 2008). Thus, fishing rights 559 
are attached to specific coastal communities, not transferable across different communities, 560 
and only members of the local FCA can fish in the area (Schmidt 2003). Moreover, the 561 
presence of informal institutions, such as a necessary training period through family and 562 
kinship networks and traditions that require certain conditions for new residents to become 563 
eligible to apply for fishing rights, make it difficult for fishers to move between communities 564 
(Ruddle 1987; Yagi 2007). 565 
Third, the period when the clam stock declined coincided with the period when the 566 
demand for the substituted species increased. For instance, the production of sea cucumbers 567 
in Maizuru was rapidly expanded in the 2000s to match the increasing demand for dry sea 568 
cucumbers in China. Similarly, the local market for cultured oysters has grown since the clam 569 
stock collapsed. Moreover, clam fishers who changed their targeting behavior were not 570 
required to discover a new market to sell their products but already had access to the existing 571 
local fish market which then exports the products to other parts of the country and foreign 572 
markets. This further reduced the transaction cost of rebalancing the composition of species 573 
in production. 574 
Although we observed that clam fishers in Maizuru changed their targeting behavior to 575 
cope with the declining stock without reducing their fishing revenue, such circumstances may 576 
not be at play in other fishing communities particularly in developing countries where local 577 
catches in small-scale fisheries are traded locally or used for subsistence and not exported 578 
outside the community (Béné et al. 2007; World Fish Center 2011; FAO 2014). Moreover, 579 
substitution in fish production may not be allowed in an environment where fish stocks have 580 
been depleted consistently for a number of species in the region, where a large capital 581 
investment or high transaction costs are involved to rebalance the composition of the species 582 
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in the production, or where a non-transferable quota applies (Squires 1987; Singh and 583 
Weninger 2009; Scheld and Anderson 2016). Last, even when rebalancing the composition of 584 
species is possible, changes in targeting behavior by large segments of fishery users in 585 
response to the depletion of one species raise concern about the stock status of the substituted 586 
species and the wider ecosystem impacts. These negative spillover effects, and thus 587 
externalities, of changes in the targeting behavior of individuals may undermine management 588 
efforts and threaten the long-term viability of households and communities that depend on 589 
fisheries resources.  590 
Overall, our results show the important relationship between fishers’ behavior and their 591 
productivity in a declining small-scale mixed fishery. In this study, we paid particular 592 
attention to the dynamic behavior of technical efficiency in the production of declining 593 
species in Maizuru, Japan. As highlighted in the analysis, however, it was common for 594 
individual fishers to be involved in the production of multiple species, and the composition of 595 
the species in the catch differed among individuals. Although we examined changes in the 596 
targeting behavior of individuals within the region, one useful avenue for further research 597 
would be to explicitly incorporate the nature of multi-product fisheries in the efficiency 598 
analysis, in which the production of one species is assumed to be a function not only of a set 599 
input but also the production of other species. Such a production process has been analyzed 600 
for some fisheries (Squires 1987; Pascoe et al. 2001, 2007; Scheld and Anderson 2016), as 601 
well as in other primary industries (Morrison and Nehring 2005). This would allow us to 602 
examine the dynamics of fishers’ targeting behavior, as well as changes in the allocation of 603 
fishing effort in response to changes in the relative status of multiple species. Moreover, the 604 
vessel data in the present study covered vessels that were active in 2016 only, and therefore, 605 
the data were limited to provide a full examination of the capacity dynamics when the fishery 606 
declined. In particular, the estimation of a capacity measure that is directly related to the 607 
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ability of vessels to catch fish, instead of the physical characteristics of vessels, may provide 608 
the required information for effective management of fishing capacity in small-scale fisheries.  609 
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Table 1. Truncated regression results (dependent variable: technical efficiency TEjt). 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
Sub-period 
dummy 
Model 2 
Common  
time effect 
Model 3 
Heterogeneous 
time effect 
Entrants –0.114*** –0.108*** –0.169*** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.061) 
Exitors –0.054* –0.055* –0.091** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.053) 
One-year-only 0.069 0.068 0.135 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.090) 
Collapse period 1997–2003 0.008 
 
 
  (0.027) 
 
 
Post-collapse period 2004–2014 0.165*** 
 
 
  (0.037) 
 
 
Trend 
 
0.013*** 0.009* 
  
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Trend × Entrants   0.009 
   (0.007) 
Trend × Exitors    0.006 
   (0.007) 
Trend × One-year-only   –0.001 
   (0.010) 
Constant 0.389*** 0.332*** 0.358*** 
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) 
Log-likelihood 109.0 109.6 110.5 
Standard deviation of the error (σ) 0.238 0.237 0.237 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.150 0.154 0.161 
Akaike information criterion –204.0 –207.2 –202.9 
Bayesian information criterion –174.3 –181.7 –164.7 
Wald test for overall model 
significance (p value) 
< 0.000 < 0.000 
< 0.000 
Number of total observations 514  
Number of fishers 148  
Number of years 21 (1993–2013)  
Number of truncated 
observations, i.e., TEjt = 0 or 1 
59  
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and their robust standard 
errors from the truncated regression of technical efficiency (TEjt). The numbers in 
parentheses are the standard errors. The dependent variable TEjt is bounded between 
zero and one: The greater the value of TE, the more efficient the fisher. *** 1% level, 
** 5% level, and * 10% level. The technical details of each model are provided in the 
appendix. 
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Table 2. Adjustment in physical vessel capacity in Maizuru from 1992 to 2014.  
  
Mean 
tonnage 
Mean length 
(m) 
Mean 
horsepower  
(kw) 
Share of all vessels 
harvesting clams 
Pre-collapse period: 
1992 to 1996 
1.69 
1.47 
7.09 
6.81 
37.6 
43.5 
69% 
Collapse period: 
1997 to 2003 
2.10 
1.37 
7.11 
6.65 
68.6 
45.5 
69% 
Post-collapse period: 
2004 to 2014 
3.84 
1.07 
8.67 
6.16 
130.2 
46.5 
51% 
Note: the numbers in bold show the average capacity of all vessels. The numbers in italic are 
the capacity of vessels harvesting clams. 
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Fig. 1. Map of the Maizuru Bay (a) and the fishing gear (b) and the type of boat (c) used for 
harvesting clams.  
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Fig. 2. Catch, operation days, and number of clam fishers in the Maizuru Bay from 1992 to 
2014. (a) The total annual catch of clams. (b) The total operation days and number of clam 
fishers. The dotted vertical lines divide the sample period into the pre-collapse period (1992 
to 1996), the collapse period (1997 to 2003), and the post-collapse period (2004 to 2014). 
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Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of entry-exit behavior and the definitions of the establishment 
types. Open circles indicate the year with a catch of clams; filled circles represent the year 
with no catch. 
  
Page 41 of 51
Ca
n.
 J.
 F
ish
. A
qu
at
. S
ci
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.n
rc
re
se
ar
ch
pr
es
s.c
om
 b
y 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f T
as
m
an
ia
 L
ib
ra
ry
 o
n 
03
/1
9/
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
 T
hi
s J
us
t-I
N
 m
an
us
cr
ip
t i
s t
he
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
m
an
us
cr
ip
t p
rio
r t
o 
co
py
 e
di
tin
g 
an
d 
pa
ge
 c
om
po
sit
io
n.
 It
 m
ay
 d
iff
er
 fr
om
 th
e 
fin
al
 o
ffi
ci
al
 v
er
sio
n 
of
 re
co
rd
. 
42 
 
Fig. 4. Conceptual diagram of a feasible production set, the production frontier, and technical 
efficiency. The shaded area depicts the feasible production set (
tΨ ). Production point A is 
efficient (θAT = 1 or TEAT = 1), and point B is inefficient (θBT > 1 or TEBT < 1).  
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Fig. 5. Number and share of entrants (a), exitors (b), one-year-only (c), and stayers (d). The 
dotted vertical lines divide the sample period into the pre-collapse period (1992 to 1996), the 
collapse period (1997 to 2003), and the post-collapse period (2004 to 2014). 
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Fig. 6. Mean annual catch of clams per fisher by establishment type (tonnes). The dotted 
vertical lines divide the sample period into the pre-collapse period (1993 to 1996), the 
collapse period (1997 to 2003), and the post-collapse period (2004 to 2013). 
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Fig. 7. Technical efficiency score (TE) and catch at the production frontier for clam fishing in 
the Maizuru Bay from 1992 to 2014. The value of TE is bounded between zero and one: The 
greater the value of TE, the more efficient the fisher. The dotted vertical lines divide the 
sample period into the pre-collapse period (1992 to 1996), the collapse period (1997 to 2003), 
and the post-collapse period (2004 to 2014). 
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Fig. 8. Changes in the number of vessels in Maizuru from 1993 to 2013 by vessel classes. 
The size of non-powered vessels is generally smaller than small powered vessels and used 
with an outboard engine. Source: Maizuru Fishery Cooperative Association (2018)  
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Fig. 9. Fishing revenue per fisher for the three sub-periods. Bar graphs represent the mean 
revenue by species in thousand JPY (left). Line graphs represent the share of fishing revenue 
from each species in percentage (right). The pre-collapse period is 1993 to 1996, the collapse 
period is 1997 to 2003, and the post-collapse period is 2004 to 2014. 
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Fig. 10. Fishing revenue per fisher by establishment type. Bar graphs represent the mean 
revenue by species in thousand JPY (left). Line graphs represent the share of fishing revenue 
from each species in percentage (right). (a) Entrants. (b) Exitors. (c): One-year-only; and (d) 
Stayers. The pre-collapse period is 1993 to 1996, the collapse period is 1997 to 2003, and the 
post-collapse period is 2004 to 2014. 
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Appendix: Regression model 
Model specification 
In this appendix, we discuss the specification of the three regression models and the 
estimation method used for the results in Table 1. We estimate these models to evaluate first, 
whether the variation in technical efficiency among clam fishers in the Maizuru Bay depends 
on their establishment types (i.e., entry-exit behavior) and second, whether there is an 
intertemporal change in efficiency (i.e., time effect). We consider three models of time 
effects, analyzing whether the time effect, if present, is the same or different among the four 
establishment types (i.e., common vs. heterogeneous time effects).  
The three regression models are described as follows:  
Model 1: 
1 2 3 1 2jt jt jt jt jt jt jtTE Entrant Exitor OneYear D Collapse D PostCollapseα β β β ε= + + + + + + +  
Model 2: 
1 2 3jt jt jt jt jt jtTE Entrant Exitor OneYear Trendα β β β γ ε= + + + + +  
Model 3: 
1 2 3
1 2 3
 
                     
jt jt jt jt t
t jt t jt t jt jt
TE Entrant Exitor OneYear Trend
Trend Entrant Trend Exitor Trend OneYear
α β β β γ
γ γ γ ε
= + + + +
× + × + × +
 
The dependent variable, TEjt, is the technical efficiency for fisher j in year t. See the main text 
and Fig. 4 for the definition of this variable. All three models include the dummy variables 
Entrantjt, Exitorjt, and OneYearjt. These variables take a value of one if fisher j is an entrant, 
exitor, and one-year-only, respectively, in year t, and zero otherwise: 
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1  if fisher  is an entrant in year 
0  otherwise
jt
j t
Entrant

= 

 
1  if fisher  is an exitor in year 
0  otherwise
jt
j t
Exitor

= 

 
1  if fisher  is an one-year-only in year 
0  otherwise
jt
j t
OneYear

= 

. 
One-year-only fishers are those who catch clams in year t, but not in years t-1 and t+1, so that 
these fishers are also categorized as entrants and exitors. This means that the dummy 
variables, Entrantjt, Exitorjt and OneYearjt, all take a value of one for this type of fishers for 
the year. A dummy variable for stayers is not included in the regression models; therefore, 
the establishment type of stayers is used as the benchmark group. That is, the coefficients, β1, 
β2, and β3, measure the difference in technical efficiency between stayers and entrants, 
exitors, and one-year-only, respectively. 
Model 1 includes two additional dummy variables, Collapsejt and PostCollapsejt, which are 
equal to one if TEjt is observed in the collapse and post-collapse periods, respectively, and 
zero otherwise: 
1  if  [1997,2003]
0  otherwise
jt
t
Collapse
∈
= 

 
1  if  [2004,2014]
0  otherwise
jt
t
PostCollapse
∈
= 

. 
 A dummy variable for the pre-collapse period is not included; therefore, this period is used 
as the benchmark period. Thus, the coefficients, D1 and D2, measure the difference in 
technical efficiency between the pre-collapse and collapse periods and between the pre-
collapse and post-collapse periods, respectively. Models 2 and 3 incorporate alternative 
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specifications of time effects. Model 2 includes a common time trend, Trendt = 1,2,…. and 
the corresponding coefficient γ measures the intertemporal change in technical efficiency for 
the study years 1992 to 2014. In addition to the common time effect, Model 3 includes 
interaction terms between the time trend and each establishment type, i.e., Trendt × Entrantjt, 
Trendt × Exitorjt, and Trendt × OneYearjt. Thus, Model 3 incorporates heterogeneous, as well 
as the common, time effects across different establishment types. That is, the coefficients, γ1, 
γ2, and γ3, measure the intertemporal change in technical efficiency for each establishment 
type (relative to stayers). The last term 
jt
ε  in each model is an error term that is normally 
distributed with a zero mean and variance σ
2
. 
Estimation method 
Given that the dependent variable, TE, is bounded between zero and one, we use a truncated 
regression model to estimate the coefficients. More specifically, the coefficients are estimated 
using maximum likelihood methods in which the conditional density of the truncated normal 
distribution is given as: 
( )
1
' ' '1 01
| 0 1
jt jt jt jt
jt jt
TE
f TE TE φ
σ σ σ σ
−
      − − −
< < = Φ −Φ                  
x β x β x β
, 
where jtx  is a vector of explanatory variable, β  is a vector of corresponding coefficients, 
(.)φ  and (.)Φ are the standard normal density and distribution functions, respectively (Greene 
2011). 
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